provide additional resources to states experiencing serious economic downturns. This paper will address the burden imposed on states by cyclically induced increases in the demand for welfare. The first part will esti mate how much states likely will be forced to spend on additional wel fare payments in the event of an economic downturn. I use data from 1976-1996 on welfare expenditures and economic activity in all 50 states and the District of Columbia and estimate the sensitivity of over all (state and federal) welfare costs to a recession. Then I review the specific details of the TANF program and the federal contingency fund that will determine how these costs will be split between federal and state governments. My findings indicate that the financial burden imposed upon some states is likely to be quite high because payments from the contingency fund will be inadequate to cover the welfarerelated costs of a recession. Moreover, payments from the fund will not commence until well into a recession.
The high burden imposed upon states raises the question of the manner in which they will fund these cyclical expenditures. Although welfare reform may have been too recent for states to establish mecha nisms to address this problem, other state-administered programs, like the unemployment insurance (UI) system, have similar difficulties. This system has been in place long enough that the experiences with it may serve as a relevant example.
The second part of this paper, therefore, examines the financing of UI, with particular emphasis on the ability to cover the additional ben efit payments that are required during a recession. After providing details of the institutional arrangements of the financing system, I explore the historical ability of the system to provide adequate resources to fund high cyclical expenditures. I then simulate the resources required to weather recessions of different magnitudes in the future and determine whether current funding patterns are sufficient to meet these needs. Unfortunately, the results of this analysis do not bode well for many states' abilities to save for a rainy day.
HOW MUCH DOES A RECESSION COST?
Research addressing the cyclical pattern of welfare activity has largely focused on changes in the size of the welfare caseload.' For instance, several recent studies indicate that a 1-percentage-point rise in the unemployment rate increases the number of people on welfare by roughly 4 to 6 percent (Blank 1997 ; Council of Economic Advisers 1997; Levine and Whitmore 1998; Blank and Wallace, this volume; and Bartik and Eberts, this volume) . Although such an expansion of the welfare rolls probably will have similar effects on expenditures, the cyclical effects may differ somewhat if the composition of the caseload changes (towards, say, larger families) or if states impose cyclical adjustments in the generosity of their benefits. Therefore, this section of the paper replicates a common approach taken to examine caseload cyclically, but focuses on actual welfare spending instead.
Specifically, the methodology employed is analogous to that used in Council of Economic Advisers (1997) and Levine and Whitmore (1998) , which focused on explaining trends in the size of the welfare caseload. Using federal fiscal-year data from 1976-1996,1 estimate OLS regression models of the following form: 2 Eq.l f _ _ + Js + Jt + trend x js + e^, where ESit = AFDC expenditures in state s in fiscal year ?, a = the intercept, U = the fiscal year unemployment rate, B =real maximum AFDC benefits in 1996 dollars for a three-person family, YS and y, = state and year fixed effects, respectively, and e = a residual.
Lagged values of the unemployment rate are included along with the contemporaneous level because individuals may exhaust other sources of support before turning to the welfare system for help. Because Blank (1997) (Table 1 ). In the year the unem ployment rate begins to rise, no statistically significant effect on expen ditures occurs. These effects become significant in the following year and even bigger in the year after that (although differences between the two lagged coefficients are not statistically significant). To interpret these findings, consider a 1-percentage-point increase in the unemploy ment rate that lasts at least two years. Summing the three coefficients indicates that three years into a recession, annual welfare expenditures would have increased by almost 4.75 percent. As expected, benefit generosity is strongly positively correlated with expenditures; a 10 per cent increase in the maximum welfare benefit yields an identical increase in welfare spending. Table 2 ,1 apply the estimates from this model to simulate the additional welfare costs of a recession based on 1997 spending levels.4 I consider the additional spending that would be generated by reces sions equal in magnitude to the three most recent cyclical downturns. Unemployment rates in these recessions peaked in 1975, 1982, and 1992 at 8.5, 9 .7, and 7.5 percent, respectively, providing a range of levels of hardship. In each case, welfare expenditures are assumed to begin at the 1997 level of about $23 billion in total welfare spending before the recession begins. Additional expenditures are calculated as the unemployment rate rises from its low point in the first row of the table. These calculations are made for the following five years, because most of the additional costs resulting from a recession are accrued over this period. The costs vary from $6.8 billion to $13.7 bil lion in 1997 dollars.
These results must be interpreted with some caution because the underlying data cover the 1976-1996 period, in which the welfare sys tem was significantly different than it is now in the aftermath of wel fare reform. In particular, the emphasis on moving recipients to work may increase the sensitivity of welfare costs to the business cycle. To the extent that potential welfare recipients are successful in obtaining employment during an expansion, these individuals are at a greater risk of experiencing unemployment during a recession and may find them selves requesting assistance from the welfare system (Gustafson and Levine 1998) .5 This suggests that the estimates in Table 2 of cyclical increases in welfare costs are likely to be understated.6 Nevertheless, these estimates provide a basis upon which to evaluate the financing of welfare spending in future recessions.
WHO WILL PAY THESE COSTS?
In previous recessions, states were significantly shielded from the excess welfare costs during an economic downturn because the federal government reimbursed the state according to a formal schedule (called the Medicaid matching rate) that mandated higher rates of reimbursement for states with lower per capita income. The federal government paid half the costs of welfare payments in wealthier states, like California and Connecticut, and up to about three-quarters of the costs in poorer states, like Arkansas and Mississippi.
Welfare reform replaced this system with one based on annual block grants to states. Through the 2003 fiscal year, each state will receive a lump-sum payment equal to the amount of federal funds it received under the old formula in the 1994 fiscal year (with no adjust ments for inflation). Note that these payments are unrelated to the actual welfare expenditures made by the state.
Although it appears that state governments will face all additional welfare costs brought about by a recession under this block grant, two important features of TANF may mitigate these costs. 7 First, the fed eral government established a $2 billion contingency fund designed to provide resources to states should the economy experience an eco nomic downturn. A state may use the contingency fund if its own expenditures exceeded the 1994 level and one of the following two conditions are met: 1) the state's unemployment rate over a threemonth period exceeds 6.5 percent and is at least 10 percent higher than that in the corresponding period in either of the two preceding calendar years, or 2) the state's food stamp caseload exceeds the 1994 or 1995 level by 10 percent.8 Once triggered, contingency funds will be used to match additional state expenditures at the Medicaid match rate.9 Second, some states will enter the next recession with unexpended funds allocated in earlier years that can help finance higher cyclical welfare costs. The availability of these funds is the result of the decline in welfare rolls over the past few years. Nationwide, the number of people receiving welfare fell by over 40 percent between January 1994 and June 1998; the decline in some states was even greater. The num ber of welfare recipients in Wyoming and Idaho fell by more than three-quarters, and even some larger states such as Florida and Massa chusetts experienced about a 50 percent decline. But the 1996 welfare reform legislation requires states to maintain spending of their own funds on TANF and other welfare-related programs (called "mainte nance of effort" or MOE) at between 75 and 80 percent of their 1994 expenditures. For those states with large declines in caseloads, main taining the required level of state spending while using all of the fed eral funds allocated to them would force them to spend considerably more on each case still on the rolls. Alternatively, states may choose to spend less of the federal funds than they are entitled to and save the remainder for future needs, such as a recession. Current law requires that any unspent funds remain in the federal treasury, but they are ear marked for future TANF spending by those states with claims on them.
Unfortunately, these sources of funds will not provide sufficient assistance for many states in meeting the higher demand for welfare during a recession. Two limitations of the contingency fund will reduce its value in helping states. First, the federally matched reim bursement system, in essence, replicates the approach used to fund all cyclical welfare costs prior to welfare reform, except that the federal obligation is capped at $2 billion. Therefore, only a small share of the cost of an economic downturn, which I conservatively estimate as $6.8 to $13.7 billion, will be covered. More importantly, funds from this source are only available to states that spend at least as much of its own funds as it did in 1994 (i.e., 100 percent MOE). With average state caseload declines to date of 40 percent, substantial increases in state spending will be required before reaching this level, indicating that states may not be able to access the federal contingency fund until well into a recession, if at all. As for previously unexpended funds, they currently exist only for those states that have experienced very steep declines in caseloads. Many states, including California and New York, currently have no such funds available.
These issues are highlighted in Table 3 . The number of welfare recipients fell by 20 percent nationwide between January 1994 and January 1997, while the average decline was only 14 percent in the 10 states shown. The two largest states, California and New York, experi enced relatively small declines of 5.5 and 13.5 percent, respectively. Column 2 shows each state's 1997 annual expenditure of its own funds for TANK 10 Column 3 shows the amount that each state would have to spend to hit 1994 levels and satisfy the 100 percent MOE required by the federal contingency fund. The values in column 4 (calculated as the difference between columns 2 and 3) represent the shortfall in state TANF spending that would need to be eliminated before federal con tingency funds could be activated. The last row of column 4 indicates that all states would need to increase spending by $3 billion, with addi tional spending of $729 million and $562 million required in Califor nia and New York alone. These levels are surely higher today based on the continuing decline in caseloads in 1998; therefore, $3 billion is a minimum figure.
Columns 5 through 7 of Table 3 report the extent to which states are spending the federal funds allocated to them. In the 1997 fiscal year, about $13.4 billion was awarded to all states and the District of Columbia, but $1.3 billion was never spent. This money will be avail able in future years to those states in an amount commensurate with their balance. However, not all states share in this surplus equally; in particular, states with higher welfare expenditures are less likely to benefit in the future from current savings. The 10 highest spending welfare states saved less than half of the total unspent, even though they account for over two-thirds of the federal allocation. Even within this group, savings are largely limited to Florida and Massachusetts, two of the states in this group with very large reductions in caseloads. Of the two highest spending states, California used all of its funds, while New York saved less than $100 million (about 2 percent) of its annual welfare spending.
The results of this analysis suggest that many states are still likely to be responsible for the vast majority of additional welfare expendi tures. In states that have experienced very large caseload declines, or for those who will do so in the near future, the savings from previously unexpended federal awards that have accrued before a recession hits may provide a strong buffer from the higher anticipated costs at that time. The need for resources from the contingency fund may not come until late in a recession, if at all, by the time these states use up their unexpended funds and increase their own spending back to 1994 lev els. In states that have experienced only moderate declines in their welfare caseloads, including many of the largest states like California and New York, little will likely be available in the form of previously unexpended federal funds. Significant additional state spending will be required before money from the federal contingency fund can be released, and that money will cover just a small share of the additional welfare costs incurred during a recession. These are the states that are the most at risk in the event of a cyclical downturn.
FINANCING CYCLICAL COSTS IN THE UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE SYSTEM
The results presented so far indicate that some states, particularly many of the larger ones, will face the burden of paying for a large share of the costs of increased welfare benefits during a recession. In these states, a state-level rainy-day fund would be required to weather the storm without facing the difficult decision of cutting back on welfare at a time when it is needed most or finding other sources of funding at a time when tax revenues are falling. (Some critics of the 1996 reform have expressed concern that the new law may lead states to stop enroll ing new cases or to cut benefits significantly when faced with increased demands for welfare during a recession.) Although some states have already established such funds, few of the large states have done so. In addition, the level of savings is small in these funds. 11
Because welfare reform is so recent and states have had no experi ence with TANF in a cyclical downturn, it is understandable if states are not fully prepared for the next recession. To determine whether or not states are likely to learn to effectively manage these costs in the long-run, I compare states' experiences with financing another pro gram that involves large cyclical cost increases, the unemployment insurance (UI) system. 12 Although UI and welfare are very different programs with different target populations and institutional arrange ments, such a comparison may help gauge states' degree of foresight in planning for the increased costs of transfer payments during a reces sion. Therefore, I will begin by describing the institutional features of the UI system and the historical patterns of solvency, and then present an analysis of whether or not state UI programs are adequately pre pared for a future recession. 13
The UI system pays weekly benefits to individuals with a sufficient work history who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Because rates of job loss and the length of time it takes to find a new job increase during recessions, the cost of providing UI benefits varies with the business cycle in much the same way as welfare costs. The financing to pay for these benefits is obtained through a tax on employ ers. The federal tax is equal to 6.2 percent of their federal taxable pay roll. 14 However, a tax credit of 5.4 percent is available to firms in states that have met federal guidelines which require that, among other things, states utilize some form of experience rating (i.e., tax rates must be lower for firms that lay off fewer workers). Because all states meet these guidelines, the de facto federal component of the UI tax is 0.8 percent of federal taxable payroll. Part of the federal revenues col lected in excess of federal administrative expenses goes into a trust fund used to finance loans to states whose trust funds have become insolvent.
The tax revenue that the states collect is deposited into a UI trust fund; fund balances are called net reserves. As the economy expands, net reserves typically grow, and they are drawn down during a reces sion. A commonly reported statistic that normalizes net reserves to the size of the state's workforce is the "reserve ratio," the ratio between net reserves and total payroll in the state. Figure 1 displays the reserve ratio aggregated across all 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1961 through 1996. 15 As expected, a strong cyclical pattern is observed. The reserve ratio grew during the expansions of the 1960s, late 1970s, mid to late 1980s, and the mid 1990s and declined in the years surrounding cyclical troughs of 1971, 1975, 1982, and 1991 . Although savings accumulate during expan- sions, they have not always been sufficient to pay the greater costs incurred during a recession. A large number of states experienced a deficit during the 1975 recession and were forced to borrow funds from the federal government. Federal funds were available interest free at that point, but the extent of borrowing led to 1981 legislation that insti tuted interest payments on loan balances. This policy change occurred too late to forestall the massive borrowing that took place during the recession in the early 1980s; net reserves aggregated over all states were in deficit at that time.
HISTORICAL PATTERNS OF UI TRUST FUND ADEQUACY
UI trust funds weathered the recession in the early 1990s rather well compared with the experience of the previous two recessions. Several factors may explain this positive outcome. First, the incentive to generate a larger trust fund (brought about by interest charges on federal borrowing) led states to change their tax and benefit structures so as to accumulate greater reserves. Second, the economy underwent a lengthy and robust expansion in the mid to late 1980s that generated extra revenue through larger taxable payrolls and fewer and shorter unemployment spells. Third, the subsequent recession was rather mild compared with the two preceding it.
A final factor that may have led to the maintenance of positive net reserves during this last recession is the declining share of unemployed workers who collect UI benefits. As shown in Figure 2 , throughout the mid 1970s, upwards of 60 percent of unemployed workers received UI. Through the early 1980s, however, that share fell to about 40 percent and has remained roughly constant since then. A substantial literature trying to explain these trends over time has found that they may be attributable to declining unionization, the changing industrial structure of the economy, the taxation of UI benefits, and other factors (Corson and Nicholson 1988; Blank and Card 1991; Vroman 1991; Anderson and Meyer 1997) . Regardless of the reason, the smaller the share of unemployed who collect UI, the lower the benefit payouts are. A recession of any particular magnitude as measured by total unemploy ment will now draw down net reserves in the UI trust fund at a slower pace.
Based upon the strong performance of the UI financing system from the mid 1980s through the recession of the early 1990s, a puz zling trend in the past few years is the rather anemic growth in trust funds in the presence of a strong economy. The absolute increase in 
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Year the reserve ratio between 1993 and 1996 was considerably smaller than that observed in past expansions of this length and size. In fact, these statistics aggregated over the entire country mask even more startling patterns that are seen when looking at individual states. Figure 3 displays funding patterns for three larger states (New York, Maryland, and Texas). The main cyclical discrepancy between these states is the prolonged recession observed in Texas through the 1980s in response to low oil prices. Nevertheless, by the early 1990s, all states had UI trust funds that were at similar levels. Although trust funds in Maryland appear to have grown at a rate similar to those observed across the nation in past expansions, trust funds in New York and Texas have barely increased at all. Not only are their reserves growing very slowly, they are also very small in absolute terms, and New York and Texas are not alone. Other states like California, Con necticut, and Missouri all have reserve ratios below 1, an unusually low level for this stage of an economic expansion. 
ARE STATE UI TRUST FUNDS BIG ENOUGH?
Low levels of reserves do not necessarily indicate that state funds are at risk of insolvency in future recessions. States could be respond ing to trends in the labor market -like the declining share of unem ployed workers who collect UI -which imply that benefit payments in future recessions will be less costly than in the past. To examine this possibility in more detail, I simulate the drain on UI trust funds brought about by future recessions of various magnitudes.
The methodology employed here is similar to that used to estimate the costs of additional welfare spending during a recession. Specifi cally, I estimate a model of the form:
Eq. 2 RR5 , = a + IUR5 ,PJ + IUR, t _J2 + Js + Jt + trend x js + es t where IUR represents the insured unemployment rate, which equals the number of UI recipients divided by the number of employees cov ered by the UI system, multiplied by 100. This specification represents a reduced form model, as parameters of state UI systems (like tax rates and benefit levels) are not included. 16 The results, reported in Table 4 , show that unlike for welfare spending, the costs of a recession for the UI system begin mounting right away. The coefficient on unemployment in year t is negative and significant. Individuals who lose their jobs may be less reluctant to apply for UI benefits, perhaps because of less social stigma compared to collecting welfare, and may not wait to draw down their resources before filing a claim. Also, some welfare recipients apply for assis tance only after they exhaust UI benefits. Therefore, as soon as job loss begins to rise, claims for UI begin to rise. The costs continue to mount over the next two years as job-finding rates for the unemployed may be slow to recover following a cyclical trough. These results indi cate that a 1 -percentage-point increase in insured unemployment rates that persists for at least two years will lower the UI reserve ratio by about 0.9 percentage points. The impact of recessions of different magnitudes, based on these estimates, is reported in Table 5 . The top panel gives the insured unem ployment rates before, during, and after the past three recessions. Com paring these values with those reported in the top panel of Table 2 , which lists comparable values for the total unemployment rate, pro vides important insights. First, Table 2 indicates that the recession in the mid 1970s was less severe than that in the early 1980s. Unemploy ment peaked at an annual average of 8.5 percent in the former, com pared with an average of almost 10 percent for two consecutive years in the latter. Yet structural changes in the labor market and the UI system that have led to a smaller share of unemployed workers receiving bene fits occurred over this period. As a result, the insured unemployment rate in the mid 1970s recession far surpassed that in the early 1980s. In 1975, the total unemployment rate reached 8.5 percent and the insured unemployment rate climbed to 6.1 percent, indicating a ratio of insured to total unemployment of over 72 percent; that ratio had fallen dramat ically, to 48 percent, in 1982 (4.7/9.7) . This comparison highlights the importance of the declining share of insured to total unemployment. Even though the recession of the early 1980s was more severe, it was less costly to the UI system than the previous recession.
The bottom rows of Table 5 reports the estimated reduction in the UI reserve ratio that would result based on each of these three reces sions. The high ratio of insured to total unemployment in the mid 1970s recession makes that the most costly: the reserve ratio is esti mated to fall by 1.89 percentage points. The early 1990s recession, which was relatively mild and followed the decline in the ratio of insured to total unemployment, had a considerably smaller effect, low ering the reserve ratio by 0.75 percentage points. 17 How would UI reserves weather a recession in the future? In 1996, the reserve ratio aggregated over all states stood at 1.43. Therefore, even a recession as severe as that experienced in the early 1980s would not deplete aggregate UI trust funds. These results suggest that the reserve ratio would fall by 1.10, leaving a positive balance of 0.33 across the country as a whole. Alternatively, based on patterns of UI receipt in the mid 1970s, a recession could exhaust the fund, as the estimated decline in the reserve ratio of 1.89 is greater than the present level. Such an outcome seems rather unlikely, however, under the present circumstances. Even if the ratio of insured to total unemploy ment reached 50 percent (which has not happened in almost 20 years; see Figure 2 ), the peak insured unemployment rate of 6.1 percent recorded in 1975 would amount to a total unemployment rate of 12.2 percent. Levels of unemployment that high have not been recorded since the Great Depression. These results suggest that UI trust funds aggregated over all states are likely to remain solvent through the next recession despite the relatively low rate of savings throughout the cur rent recovery.
This conclusion is somewhat misleading, however, because it ignores the variation in current levels of trust fund reserves among states. Table 6 presents values of the reserve ratio for all 50 states and the District of Columbia in 1996, ranked from lowest to highest. Five states (New York, Texas, Missouri, Connecticut, and the District of Columbia) have reserves that are low enough that even a mild reces sion, coupled with a low ratio of insured to total unemployment (like the experience of the early 1990s), would exhaust their trust fund; compare their reserve ratios in Table 6 with the 0.75 value in Table 5 (rightmost column, first row below divider). An experience similar to that of the early 1980s would wipe out all savings in four additional states, including California. However unlikely it is that the experience of the mid 1970s would be repeated, in a nationwide recession of that size, more than half of the states' trust funds would become insolvent. Regardless of the size of the recession, some of the states that are in the most perilous position regarding UI financing, like California and New York, are the same ones that might expect future difficulties in financ ing cyclical welfare costs.
One additional exercise that may be of interest is to determine the states that are very unlikely (with less than a 5 percent probability) to experience a deficit in their UI trust fund during recessions of different magnitudes. To do this, I constructed 95 percent confidence intervals around the point estimates of the effect of the different recessions on reserve ratios. The high end of the interval is of most interest because it tells us the largest fall in the reserve ratio that we may reasonably expect based on past recessions (Table 5 , last row). The results indi cate that no additional states are at risk or falling into deficit in a mild recession, although California is close to the cut-off. In a moderate recession (at least in terms of UI receipt) like that of the early 1980s, five additional states, including Massachusetts and Illinois, fail to meet this stricter test of having sufficient fund reserves. In the most severe recession considered, 34 states are at risk of depleting their UI trust funds, including all the larger states with the exception of Virginia.
What do these results regarding the UI system tell us about states' ability to plan for higher cyclical transfer payments in general and, per haps, welfare spending in particular? It appears that a number of states have sufficient foresight that they will be able to cover the higher UI costs associated with a recession. One may infer that over time these states will apply similar thinking in planning for higher cyclical wel fare costs. On the other hand, some states exhibit far less fiscal fore- sight in UI and may not be expected to save sufficient funds to pay for higher welfare costs in the event of a recession. Unfortunately, two of these states include California and New York, that together account for about 40 percent of total welfare spending.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Many states, particularly the larger ones, will be liable for a large portion of cyclically related increases in welfare spending. The exist ence of the federal welfare contingency fund, which provides resources to states during bad times, is designed in such a way that accessing these funds will be difficult. States will be required to spend a consid erable amount of their own money before federal money can be obtained, and then it is only provided on a matching basis. Some states will be able to take advantage of federal funds that had previ ously been allocated but were unused because of very large declines in caseloads. Many of the largest states, including California and New York, have experienced more moderate caseload declines, however, and have not been able to save much (if any) of their federal allocation. In these states, the burden of facing the welfare cost increases associ ated with a cyclical downturn largely will be borne by them.
Because the absence of state-level rainy-day funds to cover these additional costs may be attributable to inexperience, I considered states' ability to establish sufficient fiscal discipline to cover cyclically related cost increases observed in the UI system. The record of the UI system should not leave one with tremendous optimism that states will be able to weather the financial storm that a recession will bring in terms of additional welfare spending. In the two recessions preceding the relatively mild downturn of the early 1990s, many states exhausted their UI trust funds. Although two prolonged recoveries have sur rounded the last mild recession, state trust fund reserves are not sub stantial and have been growing very slowly over the past several years. The fact that a smaller share of unemployed workers collect UI today than 20 years ago has helped; funding requirements for future reces sions are not quite as substantial as they once were. Nevertheless, any thing other than a very mild recession will still cause financial difficulties for UI systems in many states. In fact, the larger states like California and New York, which are particularly at risk in terms of financing cyclically related welfare costs, are among the weakest in terms of the financial stability of their UI systems.
Moreover, UI enjoys considerably greater popular support com pared to welfare. In light of states' reasonably poor record of financing the costs of additional UI spending during a recession, it seems unlikely that they will do a better job of accumulating funds to cover additional welfare spending. States will, therefore, be faced with the reality of raising taxes when such increases are likely to be quite unpopular, reallocating funds from other areas of its budget during a time of general revenue shortfalls, or cutting benefits precisely at the time that need will be the greatest.
Alternatively, states may be playing a sophisticated game of "chicken" with the federal government in much the same way that they do in the UI system. During periods of high unemployment, job seek ers are much more likely to exhaust their UI benefits simply because jobs are not available. States could accumulate greater reserves in anticipation of this and extend the maximum benefit duration to help compensate those unable to find work, but they do not do this. Instead, they wait for the federal government to provide extended benefits at no cost to the states, which it has done in virtually every recession in the past 40 years. 18 The fact that states like California and New York seem destined to face a shortfall of welfare funding when a recession occurs may simply indicate that they are anticipating a bailout by the federal government. Even if states win at this game, the victory will not come without costs. Based on the track record of the UI system, when addi tional welfare funding is provided by the federal government in an eco nomic downturn, this assistance is likely to be poorly timed, com mencing months or years after a recession begins. In the interim, states will still be faced with difficult choices that may not benefit those in need.
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1. Boyd and Davis (1998) estimated the effect of a recession on welfare expendi tures, but they assumed that costs per case remain constant and applied previous estimates of the sensitivity of the welfare caseload to changes in unemployment. 2. These regressions are weighted by the state population in each year to yield parameter estimates that are representative of the entire country. 3. If differences among states over time are nonlinear, they will not be captured by these trends and, if these differences are correlated with the unemployment rate, the estimated effect of the business cycle on welfare expenditures will be biased. 4. The level of spending used here is based on 1997 full-year equivalent state TANF expenditures, as well as state expenditures of federal block grant funds as reported in columns 2 and 6 of Table 3 . For additional details, see the discussion of that table and its notes. 5. This effect may occur even if employment gains do not generate caseload declines. If welfare recipients are successful in gaining part-time employment that reduces, but does not eliminate, their need for public assistance during an expansion, an economic downturn will likely increase their level of need. 6. In the somewhat more distant future, a countervailing effect may occur as more and more people reach their lifetime limit on benefit receipt and will not be able to return to welfare when the economy turns down. 7. A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) provides more detail on the institutional arrangements discussed here. 8. The exact requirements that must be met before contingency fund money may be released to a state are actually somewhat more stringent. Welfare reform legisla tion allows states to use their own funds to establish welfare-type programs out side the scope of the TANF program. States that spend at least 75 to 80 percent of their fiscal year 1994 expenditures on TANF and these other programs are in com pliance with federal guidelines. To access the contingency fund, however, states must spend at least 100 percent of their 1994 expenditures on state TANF pro grams only, not including state spending on these other programs. 9. Payments from the fund are limited to 20 percent of the state's grant for that year. 10. Welfare reform legislation allowed states until the end of the 1997 fiscal year to institute their own TANF programs; therefore, reported TANF spending for 1997 only reflects the portion of the year following each state's implementation. For purposes of comparison, all 1997 state expenditures reported here have been con verted into " full-year equivalent" spending. 11. The U.S. General Accounting Office (1998) reports that among 10 states surveyed (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin), only Colorado, Maryland, Texas, and Wisconsin have created state-financed rainy-day funds specifically targeted to cover cycli-cally related welfare expenditures. In each case, the amount saved represents only a few percent of annual operating costs. 12. Vroman (1995) also used the UI system to draw lessons for funding welfare pay ments in an environment with federal block grants. 13. Vroman (1998) provided an alternative treatment of the topics addressed here and arrived at similar conclusions. 14. For additional discussions of UI financing issues, see Blaustem, Cohen, and Haber (1993) , Levme (1997 ), Miller (1997 , and Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997) . 15. When the current UI system first began operating in the 1930s, pessimistic actuar ial assumptions based on unemployment patterns from the Great Depression and the full employment economy generated by World War II led to a very large sur plus in state trust funds. Through the 1950s, states increased benefit generosity without increasing tax liabilities to bring down these surpluses. Because of these events, trust fund reserves did not begin to show the expected cyclical sensitivity until the 1960s, so the analysis reported here uses data beginning in 1961. All UI data was obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration. 16. I have also estimated alternative specifications that include these program param eters and obtained similar results to those reported. Although any exercise that includes parameters such as these runs the risk of introducing a "policy endogeneity" (policy responding to market conditions), the problem is particularly severe in UI. For instance, many states have tax schedules that depend upon the level of reserves in the state's UI trust fund. As reserves fall, scheduled tax rates rise, making identification of the effect of taxes on reserves difficult For this reason, I have chosen to report the more parsimonious specification. 17. These findings are based on point estimates and do not take into consideration the fact that a standard error is associated with the estimated effect of a recession on the UI reserve ratio. Because these parameters are estimated with some error, a state with, say, a reserve ratio of 0.9 may still run out of funds in a mild recession (like that of the early 1990s) that is estimated to reduce the reserve ratio only by 0.75 18. A formal federal system of extended benefits has been in place since 1970, but changes in the labor market have made it virtually impossible to activate these additional payments (Woodbury and Rubin 1997) .
